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INTRODUCTION 
A law backfires when it produces results opposite from those its drafters 
intended.1 Lots of laws may have backfired. For example, people opposed to 
hate crimes legislation think that the laws "inflame prejudice rather than 
eradicate it."2 The Endangered Species Act, according to some analysts, has 
helped destroy rather than preserve the creatures listed by the Act.3 Even 
* 
Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1969, University of 
Rochester; J.D. 1972, Cornell. -Ed. The author is Reporter for the American Law Institute's Prin­
ciples of the Law of Software Contracts. Thanks to Doug Kysar for reading a draft, and to Adam 
Smith, Cornell Law School class of 2007, for excellent research assistance. 
I. See Robert A. Hillman, The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire, 43 B.C. L. R EV. 8 19 (2002) 
(documenting and critiquing the frequent charge of backfire); Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the 
Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 407 ( 1990) ("[Some] regulatory strategies . . .  achieve an 
end precisely opposite to the one intended, or to the only public-regarding justification that can be 
brought forward in their support."). 
2. Jeffery Rosen, Foreword, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1324 ( 1999) (describing JAMES B. 
JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY POLI TICS ( 1998)). 
3. Albert Gidari, The Endangered Species Act: Impact of Section 9 on Private Landowners, 
24 ENVTL. L. 419, 424 ( 1994); John Charles Kunich, The Fallacy of Deathbed Conservation Under 
the Endangered Species Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 501, 561 & n.220 (1994) (citing Robert J. Smith, The 
Endangered Species Act: Saving Species or Stopping Growth ?, CATO R EV. Bus. & Gov'T REG., 
Winter 1992, at 83, 85). 
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consumer protection laws, some believe, increase prices and confuse con­
sumers instead of protecting them.4 
This Article analyzes whether mandatory website disclosure of e­
standard terms, advocated by some as a potential solution to market failures 
when consumers contract over the Internet, is another potential legal back­
fire. By mandatory website disclosure, I do not mean a "clickwrap" 
presentation of terms, in which a consumer must click "I agree" or the like 
on a screen presenting the terms prior to the completion of a transaction in 
progress. 5 Mandatory website disclosure would require a business to main­
tain an Internet presence and to post its terms prior to any particular 
transaction so that a consumer could read and compare terms without mak­
ing a purchase at all. 
The problem is not that mandatory website disclosure would increase 
the cost of doing business, which would be passed on to consumers in the 
form of higher prices. Businesses have been unable to demonstrate that dis­
playing their terms on their websites would be costly.6 Nor should drafting 
rules that implement the law be too difficult.7 Businesses could be required 
to display their terms on their homepage or on another page reachable di-
4. See Hillman, supra note 1, at 819-20. Here are some more examples of possible legal 
backfires: 
The Environmental Protection Agency's actions to regulate coal-burning power plants is "so 
inept that some of the nation's most populous areas will end up with a worse environment than 
would have resulted if the new policy had never been put into effect." BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & 
WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN CoALIDJRTY AIR 2 (1981) .... The Highway Beautification Act 
"thwarts highway beautification." Craig J. Albert, Your Ad Goes Here: How the Highway 
Beautification Act of 1965 Thwarts Highway Beautification, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 467 
(2000) .... Trial judges' admonitions to juries to disregard tainted evidence causes them to fo­
cus on that evidence. Regina Schuller, Expert Evidence and Hearsay, 19 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 
345, 349 (1995) .... Boot camps for juvenile offenders, which mimic aspects of military basic 
training in lieu of incarceration, result in greater instead of lesser recidivism. Jayson Blair, Ide­
als & Trends; Boot Camps: An Idea Whose Time Came and Went, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2000, 
§ 4, at 3. Flexible spending accounts, instead of "hold[ing] down medical costs ... encourage[] 
extra medical spending." David E. Rosenbaum, When Laws Shoot Themselves in the Foot, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1999, § 4, at 2 .... Remarkably, even the 55 mile-per-hour speed limit is 
not sacrosanct. A joint study by the Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway 
Administration reported that lowering speed limits increased the number of accidents. Effects 
of Raising and Lowering Speed Limits, Report No. FHW A-RD-92-084 (U.S. Dep't of Transp., 
Fed. Highway Admin., 1992), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/rdu/sl-irrel/index.htrnl, dis­
cussed in Eric Peters, Demise of 'Double Nickel' Speed Limit Sought, WASH. TIMES, Sept. l5, 
1995, at E13. The Federal Communication Commission's fairness doctrine decreased instead 
of increased the broadcasting of diverse viewpoints .... The fuel economy standards imposed 
on automobile manufacturers increased rather than decreased our dependence on foreign oil. 
Id. at 820-21 n.5. 
5. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Elec­
tronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 464 (2002). In contrast, in a "browsewrap" transaction, a 
consumer who is downloading software or purchasing goods electronically views a screen that 
refers to terms that can be found elsewhere. Browsewrap, therefore, permits consumers to bypass 
the standard form and to "agree" to the terms without ever seeing them. See id. 
6. See Jean Braucher, Amended Article 2 and the Decision to Trust the Courts: The Case 
Against Enforcing Delayed Mass-Market Terms, Especially for Software, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 753, 
768 ("Advance disclosure in the age of computers and the Internet is simple and cheaper than print­
ing copies and getting them into boxes."). 
7. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
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rectly through a clearly identified hyperlink. Further, businesses could be 
required to prove the availability of their terms by furnishing relatively in­
expensive archival records of their websites. Mandatory website disclosure 
may backfire, however, because it may not increase reading or shopping for 
terms or motivate businesses to draft reasonable ones, but instead, may 
make heretofore suspect terms more likely enforceable.8 
Part I reviews why market forces may fail adequately to police standard 
forms on the Internet. It summarizes previous work in which I report that, 
despite the relative luxury of time and the lack of sales pressure, consumers 
generally do not read their e-standard forms presented during a transaction 
beyond price and the description of the goods and rarely shop for terms.9 As 
a result, market pressure may be insufficient to deter some businesses from 
overreaching. 
Part II shows that mandatory website disclosure as a remedy for market 
failure is worthy of a focused analysis because its surface attractiveness 
means that lawmakers are likely to adopt it. Mandatory website disclosure is 
appealing because, in theory, it would increase the numbers of readers of 
and shoppers for standard terms, who would have time to contemplate and 
compare terms, or, at least, it would increase the opportunity to read and 
shop for terms. Further, mandatory website disclosure would help motivate 
businesses to write fair terms in order to avoid losing customers to competi­
tors with better terms or to avoid adverse publicity from watchdog groups 
that can monitor websites and spread the word about unreasonable terms 
quickly and easily over the Internet. Mandatory website disclosure, there­
fore, arguably would promote reasonable terms, decrease the instances of 
market failure, and legitimize the idea that e-purchasers have assented, at 
least impliedly, to the terms.10 Further, mandatory website disclosure would 
not be too expensive or administratively infeasible.11 
Part III addresses whether mandatory website disclosure can succeed. 
Despite its appeal, I worry that it may not achieve its objectives, or worse, 
may backfire. My preliminary empirical work on e-consumer reading of 
standard forms, as well as studies of e-shopping behavior, suggests that ad­
vance disclosure of terms likely will fail to increase reading or shopping for 
terms.12 This should be no surprise. Despite the opportunity to read, most 
8. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text. 
9. See generally Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5; Robert A. Hillman, On-Line Con­
sumer Standard-Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications, in Is 
CONSUMER PROTECTION AN ANACHRONISM IN THE INFORMATION EcONOMY? (forthcoming 2006). 
1 0. Braucher, supra note 6, at 768 ("To force advance disclosure that facilitates shopping and 
thus market policing, courts should find no agreement to mass-market terms not publicly available 
before a customer initiates an order."). 
11. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
12. My survey results show that only four percent of purchasers generally read their e­
purchase contracts beyond price and product description. See Hillman, supra note 9; see also Clay­
ton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 679, 687-88 (2004) ("It 
is unlikely that the Internet buyer will devote more time to reading text on the website than more 
traditional buyers devote to reviewing the terms of tangible [standard forms]."). 
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e-consumers may still have ample rational reasons for not reading and cog­
nitive processes that deter reading and processing terms. 13 In addition, e­
consumers, drawn to the speed and novelty of the Internet, are unlikely to 
have the patience or discipline to compare terms regardless of when the 
terms become available. Further, watchdog groups may not positively moti­
vate businesses because they may lack influence and because businesses 
may conclude that the benefits of particular terms outweigh any potential 
costs in adverse publicity. 
In light of the potential failure of mandatory website disclosure to in­
crease reading and to discipline businesses, the only effects of the proposal 
may be to insulate businesses from claims of procedural unconscionability 
and to create a safe harbor for businesses to draft suspect terms. My goal is 
not to claim that mandatory website disclosure will certainly backfire so that 
the proposal should be taken off the table. In fact, I conclude that mandatory 
website disclosure ultimately may be the most viable alternative. I simply 
want to elaborate on the reasons that the possibility of backfire should be 
taken seriously before moving in the direction of mandatory website disclo­
sure. 
I .  THE E-STANDARD-FORM ENVIRONMENT 
A. Do Consumers Read Their £-Standard Fonns? 
Professor Rachlinski and I maintained that the e-standard-form envi-
ronment presented consumers with several advantages: 
Several factors suggest that consumers can defend themselves against un­
desirable terms more easily in the electronic environment. E-consumers 
can shop in the privacy of their own homes, where they can make careful 
decisions with fewer time constraints. They can leave their computers and 
return before completing their transactions, giving them time to think and 
investigate further. Also, at present, e-consumers tend to be better educated 
and wealthier than paper-world consumers, suggesting that they can better 
fend for themselves in the marketplace. 
The Internet has also taken comparison shopping to a level that is unimag­
inable in the real world. The ease with which consumers can compare 
business practices, including the content of standard forms, suggests that 
consumers do not need judicial intervention to protect themselves from 
business abuse. 14 
Notwithstanding these benefits, we saw several pitfalls for consumers in 
the e-world, consisting of either rational, cognitive, or social reasons for 
failing to read terms or to consider them in their decisions. Some of the ra­
tional reasons coincide with paper-world barriers to reading, such as 
13. Even consumers who read their terms do not necessarily account for them in their deci­
sionmaking. See generally Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. Cm. L.  REv. 1203 (2003). 
14. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 478 (footnotes omitted). 
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boilerplate's lack of lucidity, consumers' lack of bargaining power and 
choices, and the relative likelihood that nothing will go wrong.15 In addition, 
the e-environment adds to the futility of reading because of the lack of a live 
contracting partner and the time and effort necessary to locate terms that e­
businesses can easily hide. 16 In short, e-consumers may rationally compare 
the costs and benefits of reading terms and find a net benefit in spending 
their time on another activity. 
Cognitive reasons for failing to read and process terms also coincide 
with those in the paper world. These include consumers' propensity to 
equate "low probability" risks with "zero probability" risks, 17 and their ten­
dencies to digest a limited quantity of information and to rely instead on 
hunches and processes that simplify decisionmaking. 18 For these reasons, 
terms that apply when things go wrong, such as dispute resolution and fo­
rum selection, especially may not be salient to consumers. 19 
On the surface, the e-environment appears to favor e-consumers by 
eliminating social pressures such as hovering sales agents and impatient 
people in line. 
20 However, Rachlin ski and I pointed out that the e­
environment substitutes other hurdles to reading and processing terms. E­
consumers may not attach appropriate significance to a mouse click and 
therefore may fail to appreciate the seriousness of their actions.
2 1 Further, 
computers and the Internet appear to cast a spell over many consumers, 
making them impatient, even impetuous.
22 
We used the term "click-happy" 
to describe the activity of many consumers contemplating e-standard 
forms.
23 
In light of these factors, Rachlinski and I predicted that e-consumers 
were just as unlikely to read and shop for standard terms as their paper­
world counterparts, who, by and large, ignore their standard forms and fail 
to shop for favorable terms.24 Preliminary empirical evidence from my 
forthcoming survey of ninety-two contracts students bears out this 
1 5. Id. at 446-47. 
1 6. ld. at 479-80. 
17. Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum 
Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L .  REV. 700, 720 ( 1992). 
18. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 452-53. 
19. Hillman, supra note 9, at 12 tbl.5C. 
20. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 480. 
2 1 .  Id. at 481; see also Anonymous Posting to ContractsProf Blog, http://lawprofessors. 
typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2005/04/paper_not_plast.html (Apr. 27, 2005) ("The 'cautionary' 
functions of a contract are easier to achieve through the formalities of a written document . . . .  " 
(relying on a report in BNA's Electronic Commerce and Law journal)). 
22. See infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text. 
23. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 479-80. 
24. Id. at 485. Few empirical studies examine consumer reading of standard forms in the 
paper world. Most commentators merely cite or quote Todd Rakoff's piece on contracts of adhesion 
for the proposition that consumers do not read standard forms. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of 
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1 173, 1 179 (I 983); see also Korobkin, 
supra note 13, at 1217 n.45. 
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prediction.2 5  Beyond price and product description, only four percent of the 
sample read their e-purchase contracts "as a general matter.''26 Further, forty­
four percent of the respondents reported affirmatively that, other than price 
and product description, they do not read their e-purchase contracts under 
any circumstances.27 One-third of the respondents may be spurred on to read 
when the value of the contract is high, and one-third may read when the 
vendor is unknown. 28 About seventeen percent read some selected terms, 
mainly warranties, product information, disclosures, and warnings.
29 
Impatience accounts most often for the failure of respondents to read their 
forms, reinforcing the image of the "click-happy" consumer.Jo Finally, only 
seven percent of respondents shop for advantageous terms (beyond price 
and description of the goods) despite the advantage of shopping on the 
Intemet.
J 1 
B. Can Market Pressure Discipline £-Businesses? 
Despite the apparent failure of most e-consumers to read their standard 
forms and to shop for terms, standard-form contracting is good for busi­
nesses and consumers alike, provided that market or other forces deter 
businesses from overreaching. The pros and cons of standard forms are 
well-known.J2 The bottom line is that standard forms reduce the cost of do­
ing business because the drafter, familiar with its products and services, can 
best determine the risks it can efficiently bear and the risks better allocated 
to the consumer.JJ Further, businesses that use standard forms do not have to 
bear the cost of bargaining over terms. Drafters can reduce prices because of 
h 
. J4 t ese savmgs. 
25. Hillman, supra note 9. The survey inquired, among other things, about the frequency of 
electronic contracting, the subject matter (purchases or subscriptions), the place and time of making 
such contracts, the extent to which participants read forms, the particular terms read, the reasons for 
not reading, and conditions and mechanisms that would promote reading. The survey also compared 
the practices of men and women and of frequent and occasional users. 
Respondents could select more than one response to many of the questions discussed in-
fra in text accompanying footnotes 26-31. 
26. Id. at 7. 
27. Id. at 8. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Sixty-five percent of the respondents failed to read for this reason. Id. at IO. 
3 1. Id. at 13. PC Pitstop's licensing agreement promised a "consideration" to anyone who 
read their terms and sent an email to an address listed in the agreement. It took four months and 
more than 3000 downloads before anyone wrote the email. Larry Magid, It Pays to Read License 
Agreements, PC PITS TOP, http://www.pcpitstop.com/spycheck/eula.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2005). 
My colleague Doug Kysar points out that PC Pitstop is a free site and people are therefore unlikely 
to read the terms of use. 
32. See, e.g. , Rakoff, supra note 24. 
33. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 437-39. 
34. See Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 7 1  FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 747 (2002). 
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Many scholars, Rachlinksi and I included, have discussed whether mar­
ket forces discipline the drafters of standard forms.35 Notwithstanding the 
common failure of most consumers to read standard forms, analysts have 
suggested that in competitive markets a small number of readers, whom 
businesses cannot afford to lose, may be sufficient to deter overreaching.36 
Competition for market share in the e-environment may therefore deter 
businesses from drafting onerous terms or even motivate them to write terms 
favorable to consumers.37 Because e-consumers can easily spread the word 
about the nature of the terms, the Internet should increase this incentive.38 
However, market pressure may be insufficient to discipline businesses.39 
In insufficiently competitive industries, businesses can afford to lose the 
small cadre of readers and dictate onerous terms to the nonreaders.4° Further, 
in more competitive climates, businesses may be able to identify readers and 
offer them more favorable terms. E-technology facilitates such segregation 
by enabling businesses to gather data on consumer behavior on the Inter­
net.41 
In addition, e-commerce offers businesses new and inexpensive strate­
gies for manipulating consumers to minimize standard-term shopping. As 
Rachlinski and I pointed out, businesses can experiment with modes of 
presentation, including methods of accessing the standard terms, graphics, 
35. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5; see also Korobkin, supra note 13. 
36. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Con­
tract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1409 (1983). 
37. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 469-70. Akerlof's "lemons model" explains 
that businesses will write only average quality terms if their customers are not aware of better terms 
and therefore will not pay more for them. See Avery Wiener Katz, Standard Form Contracts, 3 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS AND THE LAW 502, 504 (Peter Newman ed., Stockton 
Press 1998) ("The lemons model applies quite straightforwardly to the case of form contracts, since 
such contracts vary substantially in their terms and the drafting party . . .  knows much more about 
those terms than the nondrafting party." (discussing George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": 
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488 (1970))). 
38. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 470; Katz, supra note 37, at 505 ("If reputational 
concerns lead drafters of forms to moderate their opportunism, regulation may be largely unneces­
sary."). 
39. There is ample evidence that some businesses seek to take advantage of consumers. See, 
e.g., Jeff Sovern, Towards a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transac­
tions Costs, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2006) (marshaling evidence of businesses' 
strategies to increase consumer transaction costs, such as by utilizing rebates). Businesses that seek 
to defraud customers are beyond the scope of this Article. 
40. Gillette, supra note 12, at 695. 
41. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 471-72; see also Donnavieve N. Smith & K. 
Sivakumar, Flow and Internet Shopping Behavior: A Conceptual Model and Research Propositions, 
57 J. Bus. RES. 1199, 1207 (2004) ("To ensure the desired shopping behavior, e-tailers should at­
tempt to manage the shoppers' flow states on an individual basis. They should invest in tools that 
enable them to develop personal profiles of their customers, while garnering information regarding 
the consumers' skills and their perceptions of the challenges presented by shopping the site."). Seg­
regation of readers will work, of course, only if watchdog groups are ineffectual. See infra notes 48-
50, 91-92 and accompanying text. 
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and font sizes, to determine which presentations most effectively deter read­
ing, and can use those strategies when the consumer decides to contract.42 
In the article reporting my survey, I evaluated various proposals for in­
tervention in the e-market on the assumption that market failures exist and 
that the benefits of regulation exceed its costs.43 The proposals include en­
forcing clickwrap but not browsewrap contracts, adopting more specific 
rules about presentation and agreement to terms, requiring a cooling-off 
period, and adopting substantive mandatory terms.44 Suffice it to say here 
that enforcing only clickwrap terms may not be enough because, for the 
reasons already mentioned, consumers are unlikely to read and digest the 
terms presented on a screen during a transaction. Further, other methods of 
attracting attention to the terms, such as requiring bold text or clicking after 
each term on the screen (or both), might increase reading, but analogous 
strategies in the paper world have had mixed results, probably in part be­
cause consumers, worn down by the contracting process, are unlikely to be 
riveted to attention by such formalities.45 In addition, contracting could be­
come prohibitively expensive for e-businesses if consumers could retract 
their consent during a cooling-off period, and for little gain because con­
sumers are as unlikely to read terms after a transaction as during one.46 
42. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 479. Rachlinski and I also noted: 
Studies of e-commerce confirm the suspicion that the Internet is not yet a consumer's paradise. 
In theory, the easy access to information that the Internet provides should reduce prices and 
reduce price dispersion between businesses that supply similar goods. Although e-commerce 
has had this effect on some commodities, wide dispersions in prices can be found. In some 
cases, the disparities are no lower on the Internet than in the real world. These results indicate 
that e-consumers have yet to exploit the full benefits of the electronic environment. Despite the 
Internet's apparent benefits for consumers, these findings reveal that businesses still have 
many opportunities to exploit consumers' lack of information about goods and services. 
Id. at 473-74 (footnotes omitted). 
43. Hillman, supra note 9. 
44. See id. For the definitions of clickwrap and browsewrap, see supra note 5 and accompa­
nying text. 
45. See Korobkin, supra note 13, at 1234 ("'Notice' is a prerequisite of salience, but notice 
is not a sufficient condition of salience."); see also David Frisch & John D. Wladis, General Provi­
sions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 46 Bus. LAW. 1455, 1495-96 (1991) 
(discussing courts' varying requirements regarding "conspicuousness" in disclaimers of implied 
warranties under the UCC). My survey of contracts students' e-standard-form practices revealed that 
the respondents were more likely to read if they were required to click "I agree" at the end of each 
term (49% or 45/92). Forty-two percent (39/92) of respondents also thought that they would read 
bold or otherwise highlighted text. Only 24% (22/92) thought they would read terms presented in a 
pop-up window and 23% (21/92) thought they would read when the terms appear on the screen as a 
series of individual windows that must be clicked. Clicking "I agree" at the end of all of the terms 
would induce reading among only 17% of the respondents (16/92). Perhaps the most significant 
finding is that only 5% (5/92) of the respondents are more likely to read when they "must click" on 
a link to another page to read the terms. This "browsewrap" strategy, however, is heavily utilized by 
online merchants. 
Respondents could select more than one response to the questions discussed here. 
46. CJ Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UC/TA Mass-Market Concept and Its Les­
sons for Policing of Standard Form Contracts, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 393, 404 (2003); 
Korobkin, supra note 13, at 1265. For example, consumers might not remove already-downloaded 
software from their computers. 
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Finally, prescribing mandatory terms that extend regulation beyond the 
tested limits of unconscionability and related litmus tests of reasonable con­
tracting, such as the doctrines of duress and misrepresentation, runs into 
serious autonomy objections and a legitimate concern over whether third­
party regulators can effectively identify the class of terms that are the prod­
uct of market failures. 
Perhaps the most practical and promising suggestion is to require pre­
contract mandatory website disclosure of terms. The next two Parts of this 
Article analyze this proposal in depth. 
II. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF MANDATORY WEBSITE DISCLOSURE 
To assess whether the law should require businesses to make their stan­
dard forms available on their websites so that consumers can peruse them 
even before deciding to make a purchase, lawmakers should assess the costs 
and benefits of doing so. This Part shows that a very promising theoretical 
case for mandatory website disclosure can be made. Nonetheless, in Part III, 
I confess to serious reservations about whether mandatory website disclo­
sure can be successful. 
In theory, mandatory website disclosure would increase the number of 
readers of standard forms and shoppers for terms to a level that businesses 
could not ignore. Further, mandatory website disclosure would allow con­
sumers to educate themselves by perusing and comparing terms far removed 
from the excitement and anticipation of an imminent purchase. Businesses 
in competitive markets would vie for a larger market share by writing terms 
attractive to consumers. Market segregation of readers would be unsuccess­
ful because of the volume of readers. Businesses in less competitive 
industries would seek to draft attractive terms to appeal to the high volume 
Liberal return policies among retailers in analogous shrinkwrap transactions constitute an ex­
tralegal cooling-off period that seems to work, but return policies vary. See, e.g. , Deborah Tussey, 
UCITA, Copyright, and Capture, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 319, 329 n.51 (2003) ("Any con­
sumer could have [reported] that software retailers refuse to accept returns of opened software 
packages."); Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. Cm. L. REv. 1449, 1475 n.92 
(2004) ("A class action suit has been filed against Microsoft and various retailers claiming a con­
spiracy to defraud the public on the grounds that the retailers have refused to accept return of 
opened software packages by customers who refuse to accept the license terms." (citing Complaint 
for Consumer Damages, Rescission and Unlawful and Unfair Business Practices, Baker v. Micro­
soft, Inc., Civil Action No. 030612 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 7, 2003))). The amended complaint in 
Baker claims that if a consumer does not accept Microsoft's end user license agreement ("EULA"), 
the retailer typically will not give the consumer a refund. See First Amended Complaint for Con­
sumer Damages, Rescission and Relief from Unlawful, Unfair and Fraudulent Business Practices, 
Baker v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 030612 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May I, 2003), available at 
http://www.techfirm.com/AmendedComplaint-Filed.pdf. Microsoft's website offers, with some 
exceptions, a thirty-day return policy for all retail software products. The consumer is informed that 
"[r]etail products can most easily be returned through the retailer where the product was purchased, 
subject to that retailer's return policy, or directly to Microsoft, subject to the policy below." Micro­
soft North American Retail Product Returns, http://www.microsoft.com/info/ nareturns.htm (last 
visited June 21, 2005). 
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of readers as well. Consumers could shop in these markets with some confi­
dence that prices adequately reflect the quality of the terms.47 
Even if mandatory website disclosure did not increase consumer reading 
very much, in theory it still might motivate businesses to write fair terms. 
Businesses would worry, for example, that disclosure would facilitate watch­
dog-group exposure of unsavory terms. Such exposure could ruin a business's 
reputation, which is especially critical on the web where consumer trust is the 
key to success,48 and thereby diminish the business's market share.49 For ex­
ample, the Electronic Frontier Foundation lists "dangerous terms" on its 
website, such as those that bar criticism of products, permit monitoring of a 
transferee's computer, or allow modification of agreements without notice 
or consent.50 
By increasing the opportunity to read e-standard forms, contract law 
would also reinforce autonomy reasons for enforcing contracts.5
1 
Consumers 
who have an opportunity to read and compare terms can better choose for 
themselves whether and with whom to contract. Mandatory website disclo­
sure would therefore reinforce Llewellyn's conception of consumers' 
blanket assent to reasonable standard terms.52 Llewellyn wrote that, so long 
as a consumer has access to standard terms, her signature constitutes an im­
plied delegation to the drafter of the duty to draft fair and efficient 
boilerplate terms, even if the consumer does not read them.53 The delegation 
is not unlike a consumer's delegation to a seller of the duty to select the 
component parts of goods.54 Under Llewellyn's theory, consumers who 
agree to a standard-form transaction after mandatory website disclosure 
would have a more difficult time complaining of hollow assent.55 The end 
47. See generally Christian J. Meier-Schatz, A Fresh Look at Business Disclosure, 51 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 691 (2003) (book review). 
48. See, e.g., Efthymios Constantinides, Influencing the Online Consumer's Behavior: The 
Web Experience, 14 INTERNET RES. 111, 118 (2004) ("The physical distance, lack of personal con­
tact and the anonymity of the Internet . . .  increas[e] the consumers' anxiety and risk perceptions."). 
49. For a more sobering discussion of watchdog groups and their effect, see infra notes 91-
92 and accompanying text. 
50. See Annalee Newitz, Dangerous Terms: A User's Guide to EUIAs, Et.EC. FRONTIER 
FOUND., http://www.eff.org/wp/eula.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2005). 
51. See John Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure I, 20 N.C. L. REv. 237, 237 (1942) ("We 
have been proud of our 'freedom of contract,' confident that the maximum of social progress will 
result from encouragement of each man's initiative and ambition by giving him the right to use his 
economic powers to the full."). 
52. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 492 ("If e-consumers have some opportunity 
to read the standard terms before deciding whether to enter into the contract, then courts should 
apply Llewellyn's presumption of enforceability of such terms. Just as in the paper world, consum­
ers understand the existence of standard terms and agree to be bound by them, even though they 
rarely choose to read them." (footnote omitted)). 
53. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370-71 (1960). 
54. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 461--62; Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary 
Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 308 & n.63 (1998-99). 
55. Other factors, such as a lack of alternative terms, still may make a consumer's assent 
rather artificial, of course. 
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result would be that freedom of contract would have some meaning within 
the realm of e-standard-form transactions.56 
Relatedly, even if disclosure fails to increase reading, it still may have 
symbolic value by demonstrating lawmakers' efforts to make business­
consumer transactions fairer.57 Disclosure would show that lawmakers are 
not content treating consumer assent to standard forms as what Lon Fuller 
called an "apologetic or merciful [legal] fiction[]."58 Fuller thought that the 
presumption that "everyone knows the law," for example, is a useful fiction 
to "apologize" for the troubling reality that people who are punished often 
do not even realize that they are breaking the law.59 Disclosure laws in the 
context of e-standard-form contracts would mean that lawmakers were mak­
ing an effort to tum into something more meaningful the "apologetic" legal 
fiction that consumers understand and assent to the terms of their e­
standard-form contracts. 
Finally, mandatory website disclosure would eliminate painful deci­
sions, like drawing lines between those consumer nonreaders who are 
entitled to relief from standard terms and those who should be subject to the 
duty to read.60 After all, consumers bring a whole range of emotions, atti­
tudes, and resources to their shopping experience.61 The law cannot easily 
sort out those Internet shoppers who should fend for themselves from those 
who, because of emotional or cognitive processes, may have failed to inter­
nalize adverse terms.6
2 
56. See James J. White, Contracting Under Amended 2-207, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 723, 750. Of 
course, consumers may have limited choices because of the commonality of terms within an indus­
try. Common terms do not necessarily indicate collusion among businesses, however. Instead it may 
mean that the terms are efficient. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 439 ("Because the best 
allocation of risks is not likely to vary between businesses within an industry, most businesses will 
offer terms similar to those offered by their competitors. Less experienced businesses simply copy 
their senior counterparts. Uniformity of terms within an industry, in fact, might indicate that the 
industry is highly competitive." (footnote omitted)). 
57. See William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transac­
tions, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 400, 404 ("Perhaps we would have a more just society if relations between 
consumer and merchant appeared more honest, even if there is no change in consumer behavior or 
the content of transactions."); see also L.B. Edelman & M. Galanter, Law: Overview, 12 INTERNA­
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, 8537, 8539 (Neil J. Smelser & 
Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001) ("Law operates not simply as a body of regulatory controls and public 
edicts, but also as a set of symbols, with different meanings for different social groups."). 
58. LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 84 (1967). 
59. Id. (quoting PIERRE DE TOURTOULON, PHILOSOPHY JN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 386 
(Martha M. Read trans., 1922) (omission in original)): 
It is an essentially human tendency to refuse to believe sad events and to invent happy ones. 
What the lawmaker sometimes tries to do is precisely this-to efface unfortunate realities as far 
as possible and to evoke the shades of fortunate realities which have not been achieved . . .  
While the fiction is a subtle instrument of juridical technique, it is also clearly the expression 
of a desire inherent in human nature, the desire to efface unpleasant realities and evoke imagi­
nary good fortune. 
60. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 163 (1993). 
61. See infra notes 62, 77-81 and accompanying text for a discussion. 
62. According to one study, e-shoppers may be confident or apprehensive, and highly in­
volved or apathetic. Letecia N. McKinney, Internet Shopping Orientation Segments: An Exploration 
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The obvious costs of mandatory website disclosure should not be too 
high because displaying standard forms on a website should be inexpensive. 
In fact, to date, businesses have failed to mount an effective argument 
against the requirement.63 Nor should lawmakers have insurmountable prob­
lems drafting rules that successfully implement disclosure. The rules of 
mandatory website disclosure must be clear and detailed if e-businesses are 
to be discouraged from devising methods of deterring reading.64 Easily ac­
cessible terms written in plain English on a website's homepage or on a 
clearly identified hyperlink may add to the phalanx of readers, but legalese 
that can be reached only after several mouse clicks likely would not.65 Man­
datory website disclosure rules must therefore account for such strategies by 
requiring businesses to display terms on their homepages or on another page 
only a few clicks away. Further, the rules should bar scroll-down windows 
that disappear or are too small.
66 
Enforcement costs would include the cost of proving that a business 
failed to display its terms prior to the transaction in a manner prescribed by 
the law or at all. Mandatory website disclosure rules could allocate the bur­
den of proof to businesses to prove the content of their websites, which 
would motivate them to keep accurate evidence of the content. Many e­
businesses currently keep archival records of their website content, includ­
ing when it was introduced, modified, and removed. They also maintain 
server logs, which indicate when and if a web page was modified. Under a 
regime of mandatory website disclosure, all e-businesses would have to fol­
low suit. Of course, businesses willing to engage in fraud may be able to 
alter their records, but this problem should not be too different from the 
challenge of weeding out fraud in the paper contracting world. Evidence to 
corroborate a business's proof could include, for example, the testimony of 
other visitors to the website during the contested period. E-businesses can 
find these visitors by consulting their web logs. In the e-world, we can also 
of Differences in Consumer Behavior, 32 FAM. & CONSUMER Sci. RES. J. 408, 418-421 (2004). 
Such attitudes may have a significant effect on reading habits, as well as purchasing frequency. 
Requiring courts to sort out which attitudes should lead them to discount the duty to read seems 
unmanageable. 
63. Braucher, supra note 6, at 768. Few software vendors currently display their terms on 
their website. See Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer £-Commerce as an Unfair and 
Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1806-07 (2000) [hereinafter Braucher, Delayed Dis­
closure] (reporting the author's finding that 87 .5% of software companies did not make precontract 
disclosures of their terms). 
64. See Braucher, Delayed Disclosure, supra note 63, at 1807-08. 
65. "There are design prescriptions gleaned from empirical studies of web-searching behav­
ior that claim that if in three clicks users do not find information that at least suggests they are on 
the right track, they will leave the site." Gary M. Olson & Judith S. Olson, Human-Computer Inter­
action: Psychological Aspects of the Human Use of Computing, 54 ANN. REV. PsYCHOL. 491, 500 
(2003). The Federal Trade Commission has promulgated rules of website disclosure. Federal Trade 
Commission, Dot Com Disclosures, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/dotcom/ 
index.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2005). For a discussion, see Christina L. Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap 
Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in Electronic Form Agreements, 59 Bus. LAW. 279, 302 
(2003). 
66. See Kunz et al., supra note 65, at 302. 
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expect rapid technological advances combined with entrepreneurial activity 
to produce new methods of establishing credible evidence of website con­
tent over time. For example, if contract law adopts mandatory website 
disclosure, do not be surprised to see new web businesses spring up to ar­
chive the standard forms of e-businesses.67 
III. WILL MAND ATORY WEBSITE DISCLOSURE BACKFIRE? 
A. Will Mandatory Website Disclosure 
Alleviate Market Failures? 
Mandatory website disclosure targets businesses by enforcing only those 
terms that appear on a business's website prior to a transaction. Such a rule, 
of course, does not mandate the content of terms. Disclosure is intended to 
influence businesses to write reasonable terms on the theory that more con­
sumers will read and shop for terms or that watchdog groups will publicize 
adverse terms. 
The problem is that people do not always act the way lawmakers predict, 
and therefore, laws designed to achieve purposes by influencing people's 
conduct can go astray, or even backfire.68 For example, the Endangered Spe­
cies Act, mentioned in the Introduction to this Article, may threaten the 
creatures it was designed to protect because lawmakers failed to predict that 
landowners would lawfully destroy potential habitats so that listed species 
would not occupy them.69 Hate crimes laws may decrease social harmony by 
focusing people's attention on "conflict between races, genders, and nation­
ality groups"70 and by creating the perception that such crimes occur more 
frequently than they do in reality.71 Will mandatory website disclosure also 
backfire? 
1. Disclosure as a Method of Increasing Reading 
To make a long story short, mandatory website disclosure may fail to in­
crease reading and shopping for terms. This is not a revelation, of course. 
Many commentators seem to have lost faith in disclosure as a remedy for 
market failures in standard-form contracting partly because they have seen 
67. For a discussion of current web archiving activity in the context of a recent lawsuit, see 
Tom Zeller, Jr., Keeper of Expired Web Pages ls Sued Because Archive Was Used in Another Suit, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at C9 ("The Internet Archive was created in 1996 as the institutional 
memory of the online world, storing snapshots of ever-changing Web sites and collecting other 
multimedia artifacts . . . . The Internet Archive uses Web-crawling 'bot' programs to make copies of 
publicly accessible sites on a periodic, automated basis. Those copies are then stored on the ar­
chive's servers for later recall using the Wayback machine."). 
68. Hillman, supra note I, at 846-47. 
69. Gidari, supra note 3, at 424 ("Because of the habitat modification restrictions . . . land­
owners are taking pains to manage their lands so that protected, or potentially protectable, species 
do not occupy the site. "). 
70. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 2, at 5. 
71. Id. at 132. 
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the relative failure of laws such as Truth in Lending,72 and partly because 
they now better understand the reasons people sometimes fail to respond to 
information.73 Considerable evidence points to the failure of mandatory 
website disclosure too.
74 
Mandatory website disclosure may not increase reading and shopping 
because most of the rational, cognitive, and emotional reasons consumers do 
not read terms still apply regardless of when businesses display the terms. 
Businesses can still hide behind legalese and consumers, who do not have 
bargaining power, will continue to process information selectively and to 
believe that nothing will go wrong.
75 
In fact, by increasing the information 
available to consumers, the early display of terms may add to the problem of 
information overload.76 Further, without the immediacy of an actual transac­
tion, consumers may find plowing through legalese more tedious and 
worthless than ever. 
Perhaps most important, if consumers are truly "click happy," they are 
unlikely to settle down simply because of advance disclosure of terms. 
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2000); see Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Liter-
acy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 233, 261 (2002) ("Consumer disclosures retain their 
appeal for lawmakers despite the growing realization that they do not work. Existing disclosure 
forms, meant to remedy the incomprehensibility of consumer transactions, are viewed widely as 
inadequate to the task."); Whitford, supra note 57, at 420 ("[T]he evidence presently available sug­
gests that any success truth-in-lending will have inducing credit shopping for lower interest rates 
will be modest and concentrated among higher income groups."); id. at 403 ("The continued reli­
ance on disclosure as an important technique for regulating consumer transactions is contrary to the 
advice of many commentators, who have argued that although not positively harmful, such regula­
tion is typically almost useless."). 
Some commentators see a value in disclosure laws such as Truth in Lending. See, e.g. , Colin 
Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric 
Paternalism '', 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1233 (2003) ("The Act provides potentially substantial 
benefits to those who are less than rational . . . .  "); Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, 
and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. 
REV. 807, 815 (2003) ("With aggressive and practical reform, Truth in Lending may blossom into a 
much more effective strategy . . . .  "). 
73. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 309-10 (1986) 
(discussing information overload); Korobkin, supra note 13. Disclosure may be ineffective, of 
course, in many different contexts. See, e.g., Daylian M. Cain et al., The Din on Coming Clean: 
Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005) (arguing that disclo­
sure may have a perverse effect in the context of conflict of interests). 
74. Some analysts are not optimistic that mandatory website disclosure of terms will in­
crease reading of standard forms. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note I 2, at 687-88 ("It is unlikely that the 
Internet buyer will devote more time to reading text on the website than more traditional buyers 
devote to reviewing the terms of tangible [standard forms]."). 
75. Hillman, supra note 34, at 757 & n.79. 
76. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage 
Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan 
Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1133 ( 1984) ("Consumers have a limited ability to absorb and 
process information during any given period. If they receive too much, they either will be unable to 
make accurate comparisons or will be discouraged from even trying to evaluate the data."); Jeff 
Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the Implied Warranty 
Advocates, law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists Under One Roof, 1993 Wis. 
L. REv. 13, 28-29 ("Though some research indicates the contrary, a number of studies show that 
people make less effective decisions when overloaded with information; that is, they select a less 
than optimal choice." (footnote omitted)); Eduardo Porter, Choice is Good. Yes, No or Maybe?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, § 4, at 12 (''Too many options may drive consumers away."). 
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Understanding people's Internet shopping processes adds to the pessimism. 
Analysis of such shopping is still relatively novel, but early reports are not 
promising. One study identifies two major types of shoppers on the Inter­
net.77 One type, the "convenience" shopper, has a particular purchase in 
mind and rationally uses the Internet to reduce search costs, such as by us­
ing a search engine to gather information on a product and compare prices 
and by reading product reviews online.78 The "recreational" shopper, on the 
other hand, shops for the sheer enjoyment of the experience and, stimulated 
by the interactive nature of the Internet, often purchases impulsively.
79 Rec­
reational shoppers "may be driven by need to purchase rather than need for 
a product."80 Analysts report that recreation may be "more important than 
convenience for online shoppers."81 Even shoppers who begin their shopping 
experience rationally to reduce the costs of their transaction may ultimately 
engage in impulse buying.8
2 
The Internet environment apparently contributes 
to impulse purchasing because of its anonymity (people purchasing impul­
sively prefer privacy), availability twenty-four hours a day, and other 
"recreational shopping features," such as "e-mail alerts of new products . . .  
[and] special offers."83 
In short, the online environment may contribute to impulsivity and even 
addictive purchasing among consumers. For consumers who succumb, 
Internet shopping may consist in large part of "consumers who utilize inter­
active features [to] enter a seamless sequence of responses, a 'flow' state in 
which their sense of time and reality becomes distorted and their self­
control is diminished."84 These findings "challenge [the] explanations of the 
online shopping experience that emphasize economic convenience and the 
operation of an efficient electronic marketplace . . . .  [O]nline buying could 
be out of control and . . .  not . . .  judged against rational standards of con­
sumer efficiency."85 
77. Junghyun Kim & Robert LaRose, Interactive £-Commerce: Promoting Consumer Effi­
ciency or Impulsivity? 10 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM., Nov. 2004, http://jcmc.indiana.edu/ 
vol IO/issue llkim_larose.html. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. (citing Dennis W. Rook & Robert J. Fisher, Normative Influences in Impulsive Buying 
Behavior, 22 J. CONSUMER REs., Dec. 1 995, at 305-13). 
8 1 .  Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. Reluctance to purchase because of fear of disclosing information diminishes when 
firms have good reputations, when the consumer is familiar with a site, and even when sites have 
"visually pleasing" layouts, including easy navigation and "professionalism." See Miriam J. 
Metzger, Privacy, Trust, and Disclosure: Exploring Barriers to Electronic Commerce, 9 J. COM­
PUTER-MEDIATED COMM., July 2004, http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol9/issue4/metzger.html ("Web sites 
of respected organizations that were visually pleasing were rated high in trustworthiness and exper­
tise."). 
85. Kim & LaRose, supra note 77; see also Robert LaRose & Matthew S. Eastin, Is Online 
Buying Out of Control? Electronic Commerce and Consumer Self-Regulation, 46 J. BROADCASTING 
& ELECTRONIC MEDIA 549, 559 (2002) ("[D]eficient self-regulation . . . . may be a more important 
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On the other hand, some characteristics of online shopping may contrib­
ute to shopping rationality. Convenient access to prices, search engines that 
easily take consumers to competitors' sites, shopping carts, product reviews, 
and the absence of a hands-on bonding experience with a product moderate 
consumer impulsivity. 86 In fact, business publications paint a rosy picture of 
the Internet's empowerment of consumers who are "taking control of the 
way [they] learn[] and hear[] about products."s7 
More study is necessary before we can reach any conclusions about the 
ultimate influence of the Internet on shopping behavior, but if the Internet 
marketplace is comprised in large part of impulse purchasers or people who 
tum into impulse purchasers, it is obviously not the kind of environment that 
is conducive to reading and shopping for terms prior to a transaction. If con­
sumers throw caution to the wind in the very decision to partake in a 
transaction, this suggests only a small possibility that such consumers would 
studiously read and shop for terms prior to the transaction. Ironically, the 
very lack of time pressure that might be thought to increase reading may do 
the opposite. Theorists of the Internet shopping process surmise that the lack 
of time pressure ironically may increase impulse purchasing as consumers 
get caught up in the enjoyment of surfing for unnecessary items.ss At the 
least, additional time allows consumers more interaction with a site, which, 
in tum, may enhance a consumer's favorable attitude toward and confidence 
in the site.
89 Such beliefs may reduce the perceived need to read terms. 
To this point, I have said nothing about the reality that people review 
their standard forms on their screens instead of by reading hard copy. Will 
this increase or decrease reading? Reading from the screen can be difficult 
on the eyes, not to mention can create orthopedic emergencies.90 In short, 
reading is probably not enhanced by the absence of hard copy. People can 
print out terms, but from what has been said already about impatience and 
the like, the likelihood seems small that people will take the time to do so. 
In short, the lack of a hard copy probably contributes to consumers' lack of 
reading of their standard forms. 
determinant of online buying activity than either rational or economic expectations about the cost 
and convenience of Internet shopping or the personal and economic characteristics of e-commerce 
consumers."). 
86. LaRose & Eastin, supra note 85, at 552; see also Robert LaRose, On the Negative Ef ects 
of £-Commerce: A Sociocognitive Exploration of Unregulated On-Line Buying, 6 J. COMPUTER­
MEDIATED COMM., Apr. 2001, http://www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol6/issue3/larose.html. 
87. Paul Markillie, Crowned at Last, EcoNOMIST, Apr. 2, 2005, at 3, 4; see also Alan 
Mitchell, Marketers Must Face Up to the Buyer's Side of the Coin, MKTG. WEEK, Apr. 14, 2005, at 
32 (discussing how the Internet "turns the tables" on businesses). But see Victoria Murphy, The 
Revolution That Wasn 't, FORBES, Oct. 27, 2003, at 2 10 (asserting that the anticipated benefits of 
online shopping have failed to materialize). 
88. Kim & LaRose, supra note 77 (citing Sharon E. Beatty & M. Elizabeth Ferrell, Impulse 
Buying: Modeling Its Precursors, 74 J. RETAILING 169-9 1 (1998)). 
89. Metzger, supra note 84. 
90. For example, at the moment that I am typing this, I am experiencing pain in my shoulder 
and neck from looking at this manuscript on the screen. This is likely bad for my tennis. 
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2. Watchdog Groups 
As discussed, mandatory website disclosure might create incentives for 
businesses to write reasonable terms because watchdog groups can spread 
the word about unreasonable terms. The problem is that although the fear of 
watchdog groups may create incentives to avoid drafting outrageous terms 
(that would be stricken today under unconscionability or related law any­
way), this concern may be insufficient to deter businesses from drafting 
marginal terms that may not create significant reputational concerns but 
would harm consumers just the same. For example, a business that is wary 
of watchdog groups may shy away from a term that requires a consumer to 
reimburse the business's attorneys' fees and costs regardless of the outcome 
of a dispute or to arbitrate in a non-neutral setting,91 but such terms may be 
unenforceable on unconscionability grounds anyway. On the other hand, a 
firm may decide that the benefits of a forum-selection clause that is incon­
venient for the consumer or a term allowing an Internet site to "collect[] 
certain non-personally identifiable information about a consumer's web 
surfing and computer usage,"92 outweighs the costs of whatever bad press 
they may produce. And, as I will discuss more fully below, such terms may 
be enforceable if disclosed on a business's website because of the absence 
of procedural unconscionability. 
The efficacy of watchdog groups also depends on whether consumers and 
news services access the groups' websites and whether visitors to these sites 
publicize the information. This will depend in tum on the reputations of the 
watchdogs, as well as the reliability and timeliness of their information. Cur­
rently, apparently because of insufficient resources and questionable consumer 
interest, many watchdog groups monitor only large software developers. The 
success of watchdog groups has yet to be proven. 
B. Legal Ramifications of Mandatory Website Disclosure When 
Consumers Do Not Read and Shop 
An ominous possibility is that mandatory website disclosure will back­
fire and create a safe haven for businesses that are seeking to write marginal, 
but not outrageous terms. Terms once potentially stricken on unconscion­
ability or related grounds might be enforceable because of their reasonable 
disclosure. 
Most cases entertaining an unconscionability or related claim, including 
those involving e-commerce, look for both procedural and substantive 
9 1. See Kunz et al., supra note 65, at 280-81 ("[T]he terms most commonly providing the 
impetus to challenge the validity of electronic standard-form agreements are dispute resolution 
clauses, forum selection clauses, disclaimers of warranty, limitations of liability, and prohibitions on 
the commercial use of the data or software available on the site." (footnotes omitted)). 
92. Magid, supra note 3 1  (discussing the licensing agreement that accompanies Gain Pub­
lishing's eWallet software, which authorizes the collection of data about a consumer's reading 
behavior, TV interests, and communication partners, effectively allowing the company to "follow 
[the transferee] around"). 
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unconscionability.93 Procedural unconscionability involves the manner in 
which the contract was made and regulates situations resembling, among 
other things, duress, misrepresentation, or, most important here, an unfair 
presentation of the terms.
94 
Although contract law generally does not 
evaluate the adequacy of an exchange,95 substantive unconscionability 
focuses on whether the exchange is grossly imbalanced.96 Many courts apply 
a sliding scale to the unconscionability inquiry whereby "the more 
substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural 
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is 
unenforceable, and vice versa."
97 
If courts rarely strike a contract or term based solely on one or the other 
kind of unconscionability, but use a sliding scale of procedural and substan­
tive unconscionability, what will be the outcome of mandatory website 
disclosure? Perhaps marginal terms, insufficiently outlandish to motivate a 
court to strike them on substantive unconscionability grounds alone, will be 
enforceable because of their early disclosure on the website. For example, 
consider the term mentioned earlier allowing a software vendor to "collect[] 
certain non-personally identifiable information about [a consumer's] Web 
surfing and computer usage."98 If such authorization to "follow around" the 
consumer99 is fully disclosed on the vendor's webpage, I doubt that a court 
would strike it on substantive unconscionability grounds alone. 
The result of mandatory website disclosure would constitute a legal 
backfire. Mandatory website disclosure would narrow consumer rights 
rather than expand them. Although the Critical Legal Studies movement 
once claimed that laws seemingly designed to even the playing field are part 
of a conspiracy of the elite to "justify the prevailing conditions of social life 
and erect . . .  barriers to social change,"1
00 
the motive for adopting manda-
93. See, e.g. , Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 2 18 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172-76 (N.D. Cal. 2002); In re 
Rea!Networks, Inc., Privacy Litigation, No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000); 
Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat'! Ass'n ND, 693 N.W.2d 9 18, 924 (N.D. 2005); Korobkin, supra note 13, at 
1254 ("Courts usually search for 'substantive unconscionability' only when there is evidence of a 
procedural defect in the bargaining process. Without evidence of 'procedural unconscionability,' 
courts generally defer completely to seller-drafted terms."); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability 
and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 1 15 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487-88 (1967). But see Hill­
man & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 457 & n. 158 (citing some cases where procedural or substantive 
unconscionability alone was enough). 
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tory website disclosure would be benign. Still, lawmakers must understand 
that their predictions about how people will respond to a law can miss the 
mark and must realize that a disclosure strategy may inadvertently place 
consumers in a worse position than the status quo and even forestall other 
101 attempts at reform. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite all that has been said, mandatory website disclosure may still be 
the best strategy for dealing with the problem of e-standard forms. As men­
tioned, other solutions present significant problems of their own. 102 Further, 
mandatory website disclosure is cheap, substantiates the claim of consumer 
assent, and constitutes a symbolic victory for those advocating greater fair­
ness in e-standard-form contracting. 
Of course, mandatory website disclosure is attractive for these reasons 
only if my fear of a legal backfire proves exaggerated because the benefits 
of disclosure outweigh the costs of the enforcement of some questionable 
terms. And perhaps I am being unduly pessimistic about the possibility that 
disclosure will backfire. After all, if disclosure were a good strategy for 
businesses to avoid unconscionability claims and of little concern because 
consumers do not read their standard forms, one would expect to see lots of 
precontract disclosure of e-standard forms already. Businesses tempted to 
draft unfair terms must therefore believe that disclosure benefits consumers. 
But I am not convinced by this argument. Business decisionmakers may 
themselves fail to make rational decisions for much the same reasons as 
consumers. 103 For example, businesses may be unduly risk averse concerning 
domain of contract law, but an acceptance that is rhetorical rather than real-intended to disarm." 
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the outcome of disclosure and therefore prefer to hide their marginal terms, 
even though disclosing them actually would work to their advantage. 
Ultimately, optimism about disclosure may depend on one's time frame 
for measuring the law's effects. Even if disclosure backfires in the short 
term, perhaps eventually the word will get out about a business's unsavory 
terms. Consider the experience of cigarette manufacturers who, in response 
to legislation, put warning labels on their packages. For a considerable pe­
riod of time, these labels helped manufacturers " 'fend[] off smokers' suits' " 
based on smokers' assumption of the risk. 104 As a result, " ' [ w ]hat was in­
tended as a burden on tobacco became a shield instead.' "105 In the long run, 
however, the package warnings, along with the many revelations about ciga­
rette manufacturers' attempts to hide other adverse facts about their 
products, led to a massive change in public opinion and, ultimately, to seri­
ous legal sanctions against the cigarette companies. 106 Perhaps mandatory 
website disclosure will also have a long-term beneficial effect. 
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